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Abstract. The perceptual experience of architecture is enacted by the sensory and motor system. When we 
act, we change the perceived environment according to a set of expectations that depend on our body and the 
built environment. The continuous process of collecting sensory information is thus based on bodily 
affordances. Affordances characterize the fit between the physical structure of the body and capacities for 
movement in the built environment. Since little has been done regarding the role of architectural design in the 
emergence of perceptual experience on a neuronal level, this paper offers a first step towards the role of 
architectural design in perceptual experience. An approach to synthesize concepts from computational 
neuroscience with architectural phenomenology into a computational neurophenomenology is considered. The 
outcome is a framework under which studies of architecture and cognitive neuroscience can be cast. In this 
paper, it is first argued that the experience of space is an embodied process—realized through action-perception 
as directed by affordances. Second, we integrate a sensorimotor contingency theory with a predictive coding 
architecture of the brain that in turn links the perceptual experience of forms and action possibilities with 
neuronal processes. Here, we argue that the sum of action possibilities and the inferred precision thereof can 
reflect the understanding of the designed space, while at the same time underwrite the basis for the perceptual 
experience. To this end, affordances are inherently related to perceptual experience. Finally, by reviewing recent 
empirical evidence we propose a principle of anticipation in architectural experience.  
Keywords. Architectural experience, Sensorimotor dynamics, Active inference, Mobile Brain/Body Imaging, 
Affordances, Process philosophy 
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1. Introduction 
Concretized in space through materials, architecture can synchronously awaken all the elements and 
complexities of perception. The continuous experience of the textured stone surface, light changing with 
movement, resonant sounds of space, and the bodily relation of scale and proportion are how the built 
environment speaks through the silent process of perceptual phenomena (Holl, Pallasmaa and Pérez-Gómez, 
2006). This continuous process of architectural experience is understood as a ‘whole’ (Pallasmaa, 2011, 2012), i.e. 
despite our ability to disassemble the many sensory elements within such a process, the phenomenological 
account states they all merge into a collection of sensations manifested as an enmeshed experience. The ‘whole’ 
reflects the enmeshment of sensations. Thus, as one propels through space, the body, entirely, becomes the 
measure of the architectural experience. Henceforth, the architectural experience is defined as follows: 
 Architectural experience: A ‘whole’, enmeshed experience of space that emerges from the 
process of continuous overlapping sensations.   
During an architectural experience, the human body and brain can dissect the ‘whole’ and permeate 
sensations to become consciously aware of the perception as organized fragments. Indeed, the architectural 
experience is constituted by a series of perceptual experiences that can be analyzed consciously by intention (see 
for instance Husserl, 1997)—yet, the continuous stream of sensation endures unconsciously. Nevertheless, 
conscious or unconscious, as elaborated in this paper, the reading of our environment through architectural 
experience rests on a biological purpose. This illuminates a major challenge facing phenomenology. It concerns 
the limitations of theoretical argumentations in the advancement of the underlying biological functions for such 
phenomenal experiences (Noë, 2007). Phenomenology runs short of persuasive argumentation by remaining in a 
purely theoretical territory. Thus, a biological sensorimotor account of perception is sought that speaks to the 
traditional phenomenological accounts of experience. 
There are at least two complementary advantages of having a practical approach to perception as provided by 
a sensorimotor contingency (SMC) account (O’Regan and Noë, 2001a). First, by building on the brain-body-
environment interactions (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016), SMC claims that perception requires no internal 
representation1, but rather a practical knowledge of how to realize the predicted perception. Appropriately, SMC 
has been portrayed as a radical type of enactivism (Hutto and Myin, 2013). The central argument in SMC draws 
on practical ‘knowing-how’ knowledge over propositional ‘knowing-that’ knowledge (Ryle, 1945). For instance, 
the incomplete perception of the built environment—despite perspectival constraints—is not based on an 
internal representation of the space. Instead, the built environment is experienced as complete because we know 
how to move our body and eyes to reveal the predictable sensory information about the built environment. 
Second, according to SMC, practical knowledge is to exercise mastery of sensorimotor laws. Each modality 
varies with action in each their way—in this sense, the dynamics of visual sensation combined with motor 
execution provides a foundation for the perceptual experience. Perceptual experience, infamously formulated as 
‘quale’, can now be said to emerge through action where the qualitative features are aspects thereof. It is precisely 
due to the exercising of skillfull mastery of sensorimotor laws providing sensory predictability that shapes the 
basis for perception. Perceptual experience in this sense is rejected as a state or static property while instead put 
forward as a process of change if action unfolds so and so—hence, sensorimotor contingency.  
Although perceptual experience is typically examined by the experience of colors, in this paper, we insist that 
the ‘form’ in space holds a quale status. Notably, form is an essential component in the architectural design and 
essentially integrated with how affordances emerge (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016; 
Djebbara et al., 2019). The form of space speaks to all sensory systems and thereby reveals how one may explore 
                                                          
1 The discussion on whether the brain makes use of representations is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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the space with the whole body (Djebbara, Fich and Gramann, 2020). Along the same lines that SMC argues the 
perceptual experience to depend on the sensorimotor patterns that the eyes may reveal, the perceptual 
experience of form is a matter of how the whole body moves through space, hauling all sensory systems along, 
exploring the qualities that they all may reveal. This is indeed in line with phenomenology—however, what 
phenomenology could not supply, in terms of the level of detail concerning the emergence of perceptual 
experience, is instead supplied by SMC. Nevertheless, the heavy-lifting of SMC rests on how sensorimotor 
dynamics operationalize, which remains obscure in the influential paper by O’Regan and Noë (2001a; Buhrmann, 
Di Paolo and Barandiaran, 2013). This particular challenge is proposed to be resolved (in part) by coupling SMC 
with ‘active inference’, which is a biophysical and computational approach to action and perception. 
Contingencies of sensorimotor activity beyond ‘form’ become thus active inferences, or simply predictions of a 
certain kind; i.e., “What would happen if I did that?”  
Conceiving experience as a process is conveniently known in philosophy as ‘process philosophy’2. At the 
center of process philosophy, continuity and change characterize the nature of human experience (Rescher, 2000; 
Bergson, 2001). The continuity stems from human perception being governed by a constant influx of sensory 
information, which is simultaneously responsible for the constant change. Indeed, the rate of change can be 
conceived as the dynamics of perception—however, the change in perception does not hold a single source. In 
computational neuroscience, by conceiving the functions of the brain as Bayesian belief updating (a.k.a., evidence 
accumulation), the process of perception may be initiated by either action under predicted (inferred) sensory 
signals based on prior experience (Friston et al., 2017). The challenging inference problem—faced by such 
generative models—is to determine which of the many available actions in the environment best change the 
sensory signals according to the expected perceptual consequences. The available actions are valued by the 
affordances of the environment (Gibson, 1977). Affordances refer to the possibilities for use, intervention, and 
action which the physical world offers and are determined by the fit between a body’s structure, skills, and 
capacities for movement (Clark, 1999). Importantly, since one action may be afforded over another, it is worth 
noting that affordances differ in degree, while action possibilities differ in kind (Friston et al., 2012). The nature 
of affordances in active inference is slightly more nuanced than Gibsonian affordances in the following sense: 
Gibsonian affordance is an attribute of states of affairs in the world ‘out there’ relative to the way one engages 
with the world. In active inference, affordance becomes an attribute of action possibilities that have to be 
inferred. Crucially, these affordances can be pragmatic (e.g., “sitting on this is the kind of thing I do”) or 
epistemic (e.g., “I should go upstairs to find somewhere to sit”). 
This paper proposes to combine active inference with the SMC theory of perceptual experience to illuminate 
how architectural experience arises. From the combination, we propose that affordances attune sensory signals 
that in turn form the basis for the perceptual experience of form in designed spaces. The argument is 
straightforward: 
The premise of phenomenology. Architectural experience is based on perceptual experience.  
The premise of sensorimotor contingency theory. The perceptual experience of form in space 
depends on sensorimotor laws.  
The premise of active inference. Sensorimotor laws are shaped by (i) the possible sensations 
elicited by actions and (ii) the predicted sensations led by prior experiences.  
                                                          
2 Other process philosophers include Gottfried Leibniz, George Herbert Mead, Henri Bergson, William James, John Dewey, Alfred North 
Whitehead and Charles Sanders Peirce.  
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Conclusion. Thus, the architectural experience is predicated on the anticipated actions afforded by 
designed forms in the environment. 
Similar to how Gestalt principles hold for perceptual experiences, it is here argued that there exist 
architectural Gestalt principles that can be understood through the proposed enactive framework. Besides 
advancing knowledge of how the designed space interacts with the body and brain, the proposed approach 
demystifies how architectural experience can be investigated through methods other than descriptions. As it is 
proposed that the etiology of experience depends on sensory and motor information, a principle of anticipation 
emerges naturally from the combination of the theories. Possible actions, which essentially are anticipative, 
account for the perceptual experience and the grip on the environment. By establishing a computational 
approach to architectural experiences, it provides a promising approach to the quantification of affordances, 
which in turn attune perceptual experiences. Therefore, we suggest that a computational neurophenomenological 
approach, by quantifying the affordances, may inform designers about the possible experiences. 
The aims of this paper are threefold. Through a philosophical discussion, the first aim entails coupling SMC 
to the experience of architecture, emphasizing how the experience of architectural form depends on the bodily 
structure and continuity in sensation and action. This task is taken up in Section 2. The second aim involves 
establishing how SMC engages with the predictive processing in the brain, depicted by (variational) active 
Bayesian inference. Such an outline is presented in Section 3 and considered within the discourse of cognitive 
neuroscience. The third and final aim is to clarify how the designed space affects perceptual experience through 
affordances, which are essentially predictions, and briefly review empirical experiments of architecture. Section 4 
is dedicated to that final aim.  
2. Phenomena of architectural experience 
As one may wonder whether architects always have been aware of the effect caused by their design, indeed 
such wonder suggests a link to biological and evolutionary processes. Similar to Zeki’s opinion on artists 
throughout history, one may wonder whether architects may have been “[…] neurologists, studying the brain 
with techniques that are unique to them and reaching interesting but unspecified conclusions about the 
organization of the brain. Or, rather, that they are exploiting the characteristics of the parallel processing-perceptual systems of 
the brain to create their works, sometimes even restricting themselves largely or wholly to one system, as in kinetic 
art” (Zeki, 1998, p. 77; emphasis added). With this in mind, the phenomenological tradition, within which 
architectural experience is typically embedded, provides a useful overview of how that might have been the case. 
As the phenomenology of architecture has been reviewed various times, this paper restricts itself to merely the 
relevant aspects to link SMC.  
2.1. Embodiment 
How is the architectural experience embodied? We answer this question by providing a brief 
phenomenological analysis of experience that in turn can be generalized. This is followed by the SMC account of 
perceptual experience. 
Steen Eiler Rasmussen, a Danish architectural phenomenologist made a noteworthy impact on architectural 
theory with his book ‘Experiencing Architecture’ (2012/1957) regarding how the experience of architecture is 
entirely bodily. Rasmussen insisted on the importance of movement, perspective, and active perception for 
experiencing the built environment (2012, p. 35). To Rasmussen, the impressions of architectural quality are 
actively perceived in time and movement. Although the built environment itself enacts no rhythm as such, it is 
experienced depending on how it may afford fast or slow movement, for instance through curvy or 
perpendicular corners, steep or low ramps. The just-viewed scenes remain in retention while the upcoming scene 
is actively arranged through perceptual and motor predictions (Husserl, 2001a; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, chap. 
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4). With the series of perspectival deformations following this rhythm, perception develops according to an 
angle, velocity, and complexity of movement (Rasmussen, 2012, p. 137). Rasmussen essentially describes a 
process within which motor activity and sensation are continuous and constitutive of experience. This is an 
observation shared by other architectural phenomenologists. For instance, Holl, Pallasmaa, and Pérez-Gómez 
suggest that with movement, perspective, and active perception, as one opens a door “[…] our body weight 
meets the weight of the door; our legs measure the steps as we ascend the stairs, our hand strokes the handrail 
and our entire body moves diagonally and dramatically through space” (Holl, Pallasmaa and Pérez-Gómez, 2006, 
p. 35). Indeed, these elements as a ‘whole’ compose a complete enmeshed experience of space.  
Architectural experience consists of a collection of perceptual experiences that are difficult to segregate from 
one another. Visual information is inherently intertwined with proprioceptive information, forming an enmeshed 
experience of the bodyweight meeting the door, all while the visual perspective continues to change as one 
moves forward. Instead of addressing all contributing elements, we restrict the proposal to ‘form’ in space. 
However, the short analysis above encircles the architectural experience that is sought to be linked with SMC and 
further with active inference. Several aspects of the above analysis are relevant to SMC. To make the congruence 
evident, an overview is provided of how phenomenology analyses (i) the sense of perceiving more than sensory 
information provides, and (ii) the entanglement of the body structure and motor activity with the process of 
moving from sensation to perception.  
2.2. Phenomenology and SMC 
Generally, phenomenology does not take for granted how the physical world enters into our experience 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 1968, 2013; Husserl, 1997, 2001b; Bergson, 2004). Yet, phenomenological reflections can 
only bring one so far concerning the precondition of an object for perceptual experience. In fact, a major 
challenge facing phenomenology concerns the failure to demonstrate that one cannot have an experience of the 
same theoretical kind without the object: 
“This claim about the world-involving character of perceptual experience – that experience is an encounter with things and situations 
– is not compatible with any old metaphysical or empirical picture of perception and its nature. For in presenting perceptual experience as 
a kind of involvement with or entanglement with situations and things, the phenomenology presents experience as something that could 
not occur in the absence of situations and things.” (Noë, 2007) 
To do justice to phenomenology, however, it goes further than mere reflections and descriptions of 
experiences. It does so by analyzing the entanglement of the body structure and motor activity with the process 
of sensation to perception, essentially addressing how the physical world enters into our experience (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964, 1968, 2013; Husserl, 1997, 2001b; Bergson, 2004). Husserl, for instance, dedicated half the lectures 
given in 1907 (Husserl, 1997) to kinaesthetic and oculomotor changes in sensation during action, emphasizing 
the importance of movement to make sense of sensations. Notably, perception is not understood as the sum of 
sensation by phenomenologists.  In truth, both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty observe the precondition of ‘a point 
of view’ for any perception. This is typically expressed by the phenomenological idiom “There are no view from 
nowhere”, i.e. one cannot conceive of a place where oneself is not present in the situation providing a body to 
establish a point of view (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 16). Therefore, phenomenology cast perception as situated 
and embodied by continuously using the body as an indexical ‘here’ concerning what appears in the environment 
(Zahavi and Overgaard, 2012, p. 285). Such an account essentially predicts that perception does not conform to 
the sum of sensations but is rather tuned by the situation—and the set of prior beliefs appropriate to that 
situation. This is indeed clear in Figure 1 where the elements in the center in both situations are identical, yet 
perceived as non-identical.   
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Figure 1. A. Müller-Lyer illusion. The central line is of equal width in both cases—yet, it is not experienced as such. B. Ebbinghaus-
illusion. The two central circles in each group share the same size—yet, it is not experienced as such.  
Suppose the elements in Figure 1 were physical structures, affording to be picked up and practically 
investigated. In such a situation, the structures are perceived differently from one another as they are picked up 
differently. If the central rods in Figure 1A were dissected from their arrows at the end, the rods would be 
similar in their physical structure, i.e. plain rods of equal length. They afford, then, to be practically investigated 
in the same manner (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, pp. 106–107). Perception is not divisible to simple sensory 
events or parts but must be grasped in its entirety within a setting from a view. Perception is immediate and 
pregnant with its form, devoid of deciphering, and intermediate inferences of what each sensory information 
provides (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, pp. 14–16). One perceives functionality beyond a single sensory modality—
hence, the enmeshment. 
To Husserl, the presence provides a totality open to a horizon of perspectives that merge and define the 
space in question. To this end, Husserl approached the constitution of perceptual experience through an 
investigation of the process of change in perception given a mobile body (Husserl, 1997, p. 133; Zahavi, 2003, p. 
99). Notably, it was only during the investigation of temporality that Husserl realized the importance of 
movement in perception. This co-functionality is expressed by ‘co-intentionality’, which refers to the body 
continuously performing double functions to make sense of the perspectival changes (Husserl, 1997, pp. 131–
132; Zahavi, 2003, pp. 99–100). 
Parallel to the description of temporality (Figure 2), Husserl employs different terms, e.g. ‘co-intentional’, 
‘horizonal intentionality’, and ‘appresentation’, to explain the emergence of (a ‘whole’) perception through the 
interaction of sensation and possible action (Husserl, 1999, p. 146). Essential to the concepts is the intentional 
presence, including the qualitative features, of spatial features only based on the anticipated possible actions 
related to the sensory modality. One thereby shows that the future (in part) depends on the action one chooses 
to unfold. Such sensorimotor dynamics are arguably described at a rather descriptive level by Husserl. In short, 
the nature of the co-intentionality integrates the situation and the body and thereby allows seeing more than 
sensory information provides, which in turn constitutes perception. 
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Figure 2. Husserl’s diagram of time, based on drawings from the Bernauer Manuskripte (Husserl, 2001a, pp. 20–22). The solid 
horizontal line, CDEFG, designates the flow of events. Each phase contains retention (immediate past), a primal impression (present), 
and protention (immediate future). The retentions are designated by blue dots below the horizontal lines, whereas the protentions are red 
dots above the horizontal line. The vertical lines illustrate retention, protention, and primal impressions at the crossing. For instance, at 
the phase of D, there is a more certain protention of the upcoming phase, pE, compared to the further phases p2F and p3G. There is also 
retention of the prior phase, rC, which similarly is more certain than the further phases r2B and r3A.  
Although phenomenology does not provide a detailed account of the sensorimotor coupling, there are 
numerous trails in the literature by Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. For instance, Merleau-Ponty observes that the 
multitude of perspectives of his apartment cannot be seen at the same time (2013, pp. 209–211). To the extent 
that one moves, the many faces of the apartment can only appear by the disappearance of another face of the 
apartment, and only throughout such process can one collect the necessary perceptual experiences to have a 
‘whole’ conception of the apartment. In his description of Husserlian phenomenology, Zahavi provides an 
excellent example of the kinaesthetic horizon constitutes the ‘whole’ in the experience: 
“Whereas the actually given front of the wardrobe is correlated with a particular bodily position, the horizon of the cointended but 
momentarily absent profiles of the wardrobe (its backside, bottom, and so on) is correlated with my kinaesthetic horizon, that is, with my 
capacity for possible movement. The absent profiles are linked to an intentional if-then connection. If I move in this way, then this profile 
will become visually or tactually accessible. The absent backside of the wardrobe is only the backside of the same wardrobe I am currently 
perceiving because it can become present through a specific bodily movement.” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 100)  
The known actions that are not carried out are the actions that frame perception. These actions are 
sometimes referred to as Virtual actions (Bergson, 2001). Should one intend to invoke a specific perspective of 
the environment, then the Virtual actions that are latent within perception are summoned. Notably, intention can 
alter perception by action. In the tradition of phenomenology, the perceptual experience is discussed as 
‘intentionality’ because the perceptual experience is to be aware of something in particular (Chalmers, 1996). 
Husserl (1997, 2001b) stresses the different kinds of intentionality correlated with the presence of things to 
constitute a type of perceptual experience. These involve signitive, imaginative, and perceptual intentions 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 29). Such a contention resonates with SMC because it removes the use of representations when 
intending. The practical continuity of sensations and action in perception rests on the rejection of perceptual 
experience relying on internal representations. Instead, SMC suggests that the experience of the environment is 
based on the practical knowledge that the world is immediately accessible through exploration (O’Regan and 
Noë, 2001b). To this end, our perceptual organs are considered enacted (Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson 
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and Rosch, 2016). According to SMC, the intended perception stems from the mastery of the change in sensory 
so that one perceives more than sensory information provides. However, SMC goes beyond and argues that the 
mastery of sensorimotor relations provides the ground on which the perceptual experience occurs.  
2.3. The perceptual experience 
Note that it is not the subjective experience that we zero in on, but rather the possibilities available for any 
perceptual experience. The mastery of sensorimotor changes addresses the possibility of perception in general—
not to be confused with subjective experience. For instance, the subjective experience of one’s childhood room 
is incomparable to that of another childhood room. The upshot of SMC is that perceptual experience can be 
generalized relative to perceptual organs. Indeed, this touches upon the technical term ‘quale’ in philosophy. 
Quale is typically described as the qualitative character of experience (Chalmers, 1996, pp. xi–xii). The term 
closely relates to the phenomenological discourse on intentionality (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, p. 123), i.e. to 
represent the world precisely like ‘this’, rather than ‘that’, as Nagel puts it: “[…] something that it is like to be that 
organism—something it is like for the organism” (1974, p. 436; original emphasis). The hard problem of qualia 
may be best described by Chalmers when questioning how physical structures as the body and brain can give rise 
to phenomenal experience (Chalmers, 1996, p. 5). A typical example to highlight the issue is to consider the 
perceptual experience of color.  
Howbeit, within the framework of process theory, it is critical to understand the dynamics of the investigated 
subject. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the development of perceptual experience in time. Despite 
perceptual experience being typically examined through the experience of color, it is here suggested to examine 
the perceptual experience of form. To paraphrase Arnheim, it is the dynamics of architectural form that is 
discussed. Architectural form is revealed through diverse sensory organs. Tactility and echolocation by those 
robbed of sight and spatial shapes emerging due to differences in colors are examples that reveal form and rest 
on perceptual experiences. Forms are not necessarily restricted to the idea of lines but are rather a matter of 
dynamics in perspectives from situated points of view involving the ‘whole’ body. Indeed, form, arguably a 
relevant subject to the built environment, can be conceived as a relevant issue for quale. 
Analyzing form as a function of time, Robbins manages to encapsulate the essence of process philosophy 
(Robbins, 2007, p. 24). Robbins introduces an experiment involving a rotating cube with varying speeds. When 
the speed is strobed in phase with its symmetry period, it is perceived as a rigid cube. However, when strobed 
out-of-phase and thereby breaking the temporal constraint of the perceptual system, the cube is perceived as 
wobbly (Robbins, 2007, pp. 5–6). The experiment is comparable to the Wagon-wheel effect. The dynamics of 
our perceptual system, which in this case refers to the visual system, are highly involved in the perceptual 
experience of form. With regards to architecture, spatial forms are perceived by the animate being through a 
dynamic figure-ground organization in perceptual groupings, e.g. color differences, lines, and general geometric 
forms. Thus, the claim is that the qualitative character is not a matter of static states of something, but directly an 
outcome of enacted perception. Experience, in this sense, is an active feature as put forward by O’Regan and 
Noë: 
“Qualia are meant to be properties of experiential states or events. But experiences, we have argued, are not states. They are ways of 
acting. They are things we do. There is no introspectibly available property determining the character of one’s experiential states, for there 
are no such states. Hence, there are, in this sense at least, no (visual) qualia. Qualia are an illusion, and the explanatory gap is no real gap at 
all […] Our claim, rather, is that it is confused to think of the qualitative character of experience in terms of the occurrence of something 
(whether in the mind or brain). Experience is something we do and its qualitative features are aspects of this activity.” (O’Regan and Noë, 
2001a, p. 960; original emphasis) 
Since there are no states in experience but only dynamics, SMC suggests that the visual sensation is 
constituted by exercising our mastery of all kinds of sensorimotor contingencies making the issue of qualia 
obsolete (O’Regan and Noë, 2001a, p. 960; Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 169). A circular space is sensed as circular 
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because when acting, the dynamics of the form impact the visual system in such a way that it is recognized as 
circular. Form reveals a lot about the relation between observer and environment, for instance, through the 
perspectival view that holds allocentric and egocentric information. The skillful exercise consists of the practical 
knowledge in perception that is based on Virtual actions, i.e. if one were to act so and so, the sensory influx 
would vary so and so. In short, the sensation of a circular space is a way of doing things, and not something that 
emerges from the neuronal excitation in the visual cortex alone (O’Regan and Noë, 2001b, p. 83). It is important 
to emphasize that such contention of perceptual experience insists that the nature of the nervous influx of visual 
sensory is no different than that of auditory, olfactory, tactile, etc. Instead, what determines the sensory modality 
is the sensorimotor laws that govern the stimulation. Therefore, if tactile sensory influx were mimicking visual 
sensorimotor dynamics, the tactile sensation can provide a visual experience (O’Regan and Noë, 2001a, 2001b; 
Seth, 2014). In the very same sense that the experience of the color red depends on the affordances within 
perceptual systems, the experience of the space depends on the affordances of the perceptual system as a whole. 
Insofar, the examples are limited to visual perception, however, the grip of space and forms is certainly not 
limited to visual sensory, e.g. echolocation. The experience of the space depends thus on the whole body 
projecting itself through space, collecting, and enmeshing sensory information of all kinds to get a grip on the 
environment.  
It is not that perception does not conform to sensations, but that the arrangement of the sensation is entirely 
embodied through motor capabilities. In turn, the collection of sensations does not constitute perception as a 
pure physical substratum. Accordingly, perceiving is “ […] a condition whose nature depends essentially on the 
presence and involvement of the world encountered” (Noë, 2007; original emphasis). Point being, and in 
resonance with process philosophy, sensation and motor activity are not distinct processes followed by one 
another—instead, both are involved with specific situations and things. Sensation, through its texture that our 
gaze follows and joins with, is already the amplification of our motor being (Merleau-Ponty, 2013, p. 219). 
Indeed, the sensations that are constitutive of perceptual experiences must be understood with movement, while 
movement must be understood under possible behavior. 
2.4. Process philosophy of sensorimotor activity 
Rejecting the static existence of experience is critical to process philosophy. Process philosophy emphasizes 
the continuity of the immediate past and the immediate future in the actualization of experience, meaning there 
is no state in experience but rather a way of experiencing. The actualization of a process is the exfoliation of the 
real by actualizing the Virtuals that in turn are left behind as the process continues (Rescher, 2000, p. 22). As will 
be emphasized later, the processes that have not been unfolded, i.e. the Virtuals, play a critical role in the 
architectural experience. SMC already hints that the Virtual supports the actual. Conceiving architectural 
experience through the lens of process philosophy, at once, the architectural experience can only be captured in 
its transtemporal dynamics (Djebbara, Fich and Gramann, 2019), and these elements of the transtemporal 
dynamics entail the body. 
Ontologically, process philosophy casts the nature of processes as Janus-faced, i.e. they face inward and 
outward. In principle, the internal structure of a process may be constituted by smaller processes, while being 
itself constituted by a greater process. A hierarchical organization of short-term process and long-term processes 
is central to the ontology of process philosophy (see e.g. Klein, 2014). As will be elaborated in Section 3, the 
hierarchical structure is indeed embedded in the structure of the brain. For now, architectural experience has 
been drawn through the combined lenses of phenomenology and SMC emphasizing how the experience of 
architecture depends on the bodily structure and continuity in sensation and action. SMC, however, is faced with 
the challenge of providing the neuronal basis on which the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies unfolds. To 
this end, Section 3 briefly reviews active inference as corresponding to the action-perception loop.  
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3. A process theory of action-perception 
Process philosophy casts the sun not as a thing, but as an enduring fire and Heraclitus’ river a continuous 
flow and not a fixed object. Everything the world is made of is a continuous process of activity and change that 
mutually affect one another. The major point of SMC is that a cortical structure ‘alone’ cannot account for 
perception but depends on reciprocal causality with the body, brain, and environment (Clark, 1999; Noë, 2004; 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016). Since our perception of the world can only be as good as the information 
garnered by sensory systems, defective sensory systems can theoretically enact a multiplicity of worlds. Assuming 
intact sensory systems, the enacted information reveals something about the world—however, it was argued 
throughout phenomenology and SMC that our perception of the world is not provided by the sum of bottom-up 
sensory. Instead, there is a context-sensitive top-down prediction based on prior experiences that guides our 
active ‘palpation’ of the sensorium. 
The current trend in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy considers the brain as an organ of inference, 
generating (Bayes optimal) predictions (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015). 
Embodied perception is similarly gaining momentum in the predictive framework (Thompson and Varela, 2001; 
Seth, 2014; Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016; Gallagher and Allen, 2018). Generally, the predictive brain 
framework draws on the fundamental condition for survival in any biological system, which is the maintenance 
of physiological balances ensuring the necessary preconditions for survival (Friston, 2005; Damasio, 2010). By 
maintaining physiological—and other existential—states within bounds, the biological organism resists disorder, 
dissipation, decay, and ultimately death.  
The free energy principle (FEP) is a first principle description of the requisite dynamics, describing how the 
biological organism resists the tendency to disorder by minimizing the surprise associated with the sensory 
sampling of the environment (the surprise is variously referred to as self-information, surprisal, prediction error, 
etc). The following section considers a computational account of action and perception3 by briefly reviewing a 
corollary of the free energy principle (Friston, 2010), namely ‘active inference’ (Friston et al., 2017). By 
computational it is meant algorithmic. Active inference is ‘algorithmic’ in the sense that it is a realizable 
biophysical process that performs approximate Bayesian inference (and implicitly surprise minimization), rather 
than an abstract ‘algebraic’ formula. 
Introducing approximate Bayesian inference eludes the intractable issue of estimating all possible values of 
hidden states or latent states of the world generating sensory samples. For the embodied brain to infer the cause 
of sensory samples, it instead performs an approximate Bayesian inference, known as Bayesian belief updating of 
one form or another (e.g., predictive coding or belief propagation). Applying Bayes formula to infer causes of 
sensation rests on the following formulation: 
𝑝(𝑠|𝑜) =
 𝑝(𝑜|𝑠)𝑝(𝑠)
𝑝(𝑜)
↔ 𝑝(𝑜) =
 𝑝(𝑜|𝑠)𝑝(𝑠)
𝑝(𝑠|𝑜)
 
Importantly, Bayes’ theorem quantifies the probability of a hidden state given an observation. The probability 
of an observation ‘p(o)’ functions as a quantity that represents the score of the model. This score is known as 
Bayesian model evidence or marginal likelihood—and is simply the probability of an outcome under a model of 
how that outcome was generated. The imperative for survival is to ensure outcomes are not surprising and their 
probability is maximized. This is the same as maximizing the evidence for the organism's generative model; 
sometimes referred to as self evidencing (Hohwy, 2016). The embodied brain must therefore sample outcomes 
                                                          
3 Unnecessary technical details are relegated to footnotes. 
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that provide evidence for its model of the world; namely, evidence for its own existence. However, estimating 
the evidence explicitly is usually an intractable issue, as there may exist infinite causes of each sensory signal 
(Figure 3). This brings us to approximate Bayesian inference as a realizable process that brings Bayesian beliefs 
about the causes of sensory outcomes as close as possible to the true posterior distribution ‘p(s|o)’ based upon 
Bayes rule above. In other words, inference means finding the most likely probability distribution over the states 
generating outcomes, given those outcomes and a generative model. By introducing a free energy functional of 
Bayesian belief about states of the world, one can convert an intractable inference problem into a tractable 
optimization problem that can, in principle, be solved using neuronal dynamics — cast as a gradient flow on free 
energy (Friston, 2010).  
In summary, the model evidence ‘p(o)’ quantifies how well the model predicts observations. It is also known 
as the marginal likelihood because it is the sum of all possible hidden states given a sensory signal (it marginalizes 
the hidden state). Although the evidence cannot be estimated directly, there exists a free energy approximation to 
model evidence that is a function of Bayesian beliefs. By changing Bayesian beliefs—encoded by neuronal 
activity—to minimize the free energy, the surprise is minimized and free energy becomes the (negative) 
logarithm of model evidence. At the same time, the Bayesian beliefs become posterior beliefs about their causes 
of sensory outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 3. Architecture functions as a hidden state that the brain must infer to perceive. The hidden state generates a sensory 
outcome, which in turn enters a Bayes inferential loop that infers the cause of the sensory outcome resulting in an inferred state about the 
hidden state. ‘s*’ designates the true state, as opposed to the inferred state, which is ‘s’ without an asterisk. Technically, ‘s’ is a hypothesis 
about ‘s*’. The inference is the process of computing p(s|o) – i.e., the probability of each hypothetical state given the observations. While 
a subtle difference, this highlights that the result of inference is a (posterior) probability distribution, not a single state. However, the states 
described by this distribution do not necessarily include the hidden state in the outside world. 
3.1. Two modes of perception 
In brief, active inference cast the process of perception as a process of inferring the external causes of 
sensory signals. When dealing with models of discrete ‘states of affairs’  it usually considers a hierarchical 
generative model based on a discrete Markov decision process (MDP). In this setting, perception of the 
environment is inferred by reducing uncertainty about hidden or latent states in the world under the assumption 
observable outcomes were generated by this process 4. Crucially, a Markov decision process puts action into the 
generative model because the (Markovian) evolution of states over time depends upon choices, decisions, or 
actions.  
This consequently means that a living organism does not have direct access to the world, but must use its 
sensory organs to infer states of affairs in the environment. Perception thus emerges from the generative model 
of latent, hidden or external causes that best explain the sensorimotor dynamics. This inference to the best 
explanation can either involve belief updating to explain current sensory samples to minimize surprise or, 
                                                          
4 Indeed, the free energy principle builds primarily on information theory where the uncertainty about the observations is considered as 
Shannon entropy: 𝐻(𝑥) = −∑ 𝑝(𝑥)𝑥 ∙ log 𝑝(𝑥). This was initially developed for estimating the surprise of signals. Information in this 
sense is defined as the ‘newness’ in the provided knowledge that was not earlier predicted—hence, surprise.   
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alternatively, one can change the sensory signals by acting in the environment to make them less surprising (i.e., 
bring sensations into line with predictions). These complementary facets of minimizing surprise or free energy 
can be thought of as perception and action respectively. However, they both work hand-in-hand in the service of 
active inference or self evidencing. The ensuing relationship between action and inferring the causes of 
sensations constitutes active perception of the environment, which is well in line with phenomenology and SMC.  
In summary, there are two aspects to perceptual inference or synthesis. One is to approximate the sensory 
information by inferring the causes of sensory signals. Another is to alter the sensory signals by acting on the 
environment to solicit the kind of signals that minimize surprise and uncertainty. The aim is to unpack active 
inference according to phenomenology and SMC and thereby provide a deeper insight into the dynamics of 
sensation, action, and perception. Admittedly, although SMC provides an account of perception by way of 
anticipation of sensations if one were to act, it did not, however, provide a corresponding neuronal process 
theory. Therefore, if the SMC framework can be cast as variational Bayesian inference under a Markov decision 
process, the following provides a quantitative account of (i) perception by minimizing surprise, and (ii) action 
which minimizes expected surprise (i.e., uncertainty).  
 
3.1.1. The mode of approximation 
Sensory information is continuously solicited by sensory organs. The implicit sensory enaction rests on top-
down predictions that quantify surprise, often thought of as a prediction error; namely, the mismatch between 
what was observed and what was predicted. Therefore, perception of the world rests on the ability to minimize 
prediction errors using the continuous influx of sensory information. In predictive coding formulations of active 
inference, the error estimation is simply given by the difference between the top-down prediction and the 
incoming bottom-up sensory signal. More generally, we can cast this kind of evidence accumulation or Bayesian 
belief updating in terms of Bayesian beliefs about hidden states—denoted ‘q’—that approximate the true 
posterior probability—denoted ‘p’. The main goal of perception is to approximate the true probability by 
minimizing the difference between ‘q’ and ‘p’ where ‘q’ is encoded by neuronal activity.  
The quality of this approximation takes the shape of Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-D), which is a measure 
of how one probability distribution (or density) differs from another (Kullback and Leibler, 1951)5. In other 
words, the KL-D describes how well one probability distribution matches another, where KL-D equals zero 
corresponds to a perfect match. KL-D measures the anticipated number of extra bits required to code samples 
from ‘p’ when using an approximation ‘q’—thus, KL is not a direct measure of distance (Bishop, 2006, p. 55), 
but rather an indirect measure of uncertainty, reflecting how surprising a set of sensory outcomes are on average. 
Additionally, due to the nonnegative properties of KL-D6, it is possible to apply Jensen’s inequality to ensure that 
a minimum exists. Consequently, it is possible to bring ‘q’ towards the true probability distribution ‘p’ by 
minimizing a (free energy) functional that includes this divergence. By subtracting the log-evidence from the 
divergence, we obtain Feynman’s (1972) variational free energy that represents a bound on the log-evidence (see 
Appendix for more details).  
In short, free energy is the divergence between approximate and true posterior beliefs minus log-evidence. 
Minimizing free energy minimizes the divergence between Bayesian beliefs and the true posterior beliefs while, at 
                                                          
5 The KL-D is defined as: 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑝||𝑞) = 𝐻(𝑝, 𝑞) − 𝐻(𝑝), where ‘p’ is the reference probability being compared to ‘q’, and H(p,q) is a 
cross entropy. The outcome reflects how well the probability ‘q’ approximates the probability ‘p’. Relevant to the purpose of active 
inference, the KL-D can be written in the expectation, discrete and continuous form too: 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑝||𝑞) = 𝐸𝑝 [log
𝑝(𝑥)
𝑞(𝑥)
] = ∑ 𝑝(𝑥) log
𝑝(𝑥)
𝑞(𝑥)𝑥
 
if x is a categorical variable, or 𝐸𝑝 [log
𝑝(𝑥)
𝑞(𝑥)
] = ∑ 𝑝(𝑥) log
𝑝(𝑥)
𝑞(𝑥)𝑥
= ∫ 𝑝(𝑥) log
𝑝(𝑥)
𝑞(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥 if it is continuous. 
6 Negative log is convex where Jensen’s rule of inequality applies. 
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the same time, minimizing negative log-evidence. Note that the divergence depends upon Bayesian beliefs (i.e., 
perception), while the log-evidence depends upon outcomes that are actively solicited (i.e., action).  
Another useful formulation is in terms of accuracy and complexity: 
𝐹 = 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑞(𝑠)||𝑝(𝑠))⏟          
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦
− 𝐸𝑞[ln 𝑝(𝑜|𝑠)]⏟        
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦
 
The Bayesian beliefs that minimize free energy therefore provide an accurate account of the sensory 
outcomes in the simplest way possible. Here, complexity is the divergence between approximate posterior 
(Bayesian) and prior beliefs; in other words, how much one has to ‘change one's mind’ to explain the data at 
hand. This formulation reveals the nature of Bayesian belief updating: active inference or self-evidencing 
minimizes the variational free energy, which can either be thought of (i) minimizing a KL-D bound on surprise 
or (ii) providing the simplest and accurate account of observed outcomes. 
 
The mode of action 
As noted above, action can directly minimize free energy by changing the outcomes that are sampled. 
However, actively minimizing free energy requires the free energy expected following an action. This is ‘expected 
free energy’. In active inference, actions are predictions themselves, that rest upon Bayesian beliefs about 
policies—that are composed of action sequences to act. Each policy has an expected free energy, which scores 
how likely it is that this policy is being pursued. The lower the expected free energy of a policy, the more likely it 
is to be selected.  
In contrast to perception as a process that minimizes surprise, action minimizes expected surprise, namely 
uncertainty, i.e. expected free energy. Since active inference is based on information theory, the uncertainty 
corresponds to entropy, where the expected entropy can be given decomposed into extrinsic (pragmatic, goal-
seeking) and intrinsic (epistemic, information-seeking) parts (Kaplan and Friston, 2018). Depending on the 
person in question and the associated prior beliefs, one may have an information-seeking and epistemic behavior 
that is comparable to the wandering through a museum—foraging for information—or a pragmatic behavior 
that is comparable to seeking the restaurant. Epistemic behavior seeks towards increasing salience and novelty, 
while pragmatic behavior seeks towards a particular outcome cast in terms of prior preferences.  
Importantly, both behaviors depend on the outcome of the sensorimotor dynamics. Aligning with SMC, 
perception depends on the incoming sensory and the predicted observations under a particular policy. Therefore, 
the sensorimotor dynamics can be conceived of underwriting expected free energy. The expected free energy is 
given by the free energy as conditioned on action policies, i.e. the expectation over hidden states and yet to be 
observed outcomes, i.e. ‘q(o, s)’. In the same way that we can split free energy into complexity and accuracy, the 
expected free energy can be split into risk and ambiguity. We can also express expected free energy as the expected 
KL bound on log evidence (intrinsic value) and the expected log evidence per se (extrinsic value): 
 
𝐺(𝜋, 𝜏) = 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑞(𝑜𝜏|𝜋)||𝑞(𝑜𝜏))⏟            
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
+ 𝐸?̃?[𝐻[𝑞(𝑜𝜏|𝑠𝜏)]]⏟          
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
= 𝐸?̃?[ln 𝑞(𝑠𝜏|𝑜𝜏, 𝜋) − ln 𝑞(𝑠𝜏|𝜋)]⏟                    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
− 𝐸?̃?[ln 𝑞(𝑜𝜏)]⏟        
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
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In brief, the expected free energy comprises the expected cost, which is the divergence between the expected 
outcome under an action policy and the prior preference, and the expected ambiguity7. Perhaps the most 
intuitive way to understand the selection of actions that minimize expected free energy is to think about the way 
we deploy our visual gaze. This has two components; namely, responding to epistemic affordance in the form of 
intrinsic value to resolve uncertainty about the visual scene, based upon the salience or intrinsic value of ‘looking 
over there’. At the same time, there will be a pragmatic value in avoiding unlikely sensations, such as looking 
directly at the sun. A complementary perspective on this is in terms of risk and ambiguity: “I will resolve 
uncertainty by minimizing ambiguity while avoiding the risk incurred by looking directly at the sun”.  
Following active inference, one should not expect sensorimotor-related surprises in scenarios that are 
predictable in practical terms—however, one should instead expect an emerging sensorimotor pattern 
culminating in a practical experience relative to that perception and that predicted action. The architectural 
experience is not present; it is predicted. 
Interpreting sensorimotor contingencies in light of active inference, perception emerges from the dynamics 
of minimizing the uncertainty about beliefs under a particular action. According to O’Regan and Noë, the kind 
of knowledge in SMC is practical, in the sense that the perceiver knows how to interact with the percept; it is a 
skillful deployment of specialized practical knowledge relative to the sensory organ. It is knowing “[…] the ways 
in which stimulation in a certain sense modality changes, contingent upon movements or actions of the 
organism” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 25). Such dynamics encompass a multiplicity of modalities as all sensory 
modalities are expected to be affected by an action. The enmeshment of sensory into a ‘whole’ experience is 
beyond the scope of active inference alone—however, combined with SMC, who provides an account of the 
‘binding’ of sensory modalities, the framework reaches novel heights (Seth, 2014). From this brief review of 
active inference, it is exhibited that the computational model grants a phenomenological alignment that 
corresponds to SMC.  
3.2. A computational neurophenomenology? 
The term ‘neurophenomenology’ emerged in a paper by Varela (1999) when investigating time and 
perception. It is an attempt at correlating the continuous phenomenal experience with brain activity and thereby 
operating between quantitative and qualitative methods (Olivares et al., 2015). Meanwhile, computational 
phenomenology provides an explanatory framework of perceptual experience as the outcome of a functional 
system that translates physical stimulus to meaningful percepts (Harlan, 1984). According to the current 
framework, the translation from physical stimuli to meaningful and phenomenal percepts involves the practical 
coherence between brain, body, and environment. A computational neurophenomenology, therefore, reflects a 
research domain that seeks to go beyond neurophenomenology by adding a computational aspect, while going 
beyond computational phenomenology by adding an aspect of neuroscience. Notably, the framework is a 
process theory that attempts to understand perceptual experience through the dynamics between action and 
perception.  
Both phenomenology and SMC have been introduced as processes theories while active inference has been 
introduced as a belief updating or propagation scheme can be realized in physical processes (described in terms 
of securing evidence for generative models of the world). How do we identify and characterize a process? 
Although active inference can be stated in continuous form, the essential property of the process theory for 
discrete states (e.g., the Markov decision process generative model above) is its recursive temporal structure. 
Continuity is provided in phenomenology by the temporal structure of experience as provided by Husserl 
                                                          
7 Note that ?̃? is the predicted posterior distribution given a probabilistic mapping (likelihood, A) from hidden states 𝑠𝜏 to outcomes 𝑜𝜏 
under a policy 𝜋 at the time 𝜏 in the future: ?̃? =  𝑝(𝑜𝜏|𝑠𝜏)𝑞(𝑠𝜏|𝜋)𝑞(𝐴). 
15 
 
15 
 
(2001a). The experience of a specious present depends on the unity of the immediate past and immediate future 
(Figure 2). This is indeed reflected in the process of active inference because the current state did not occur 
juxtaposed as “[…] just one darn thing after another” but rather as an interpenetrated causal process that 
stretches in time as it is actualized (Rescher, 2013, p. 29). Besides being actualized, a process also needs to respect 
a ‘space-less transition’ principle. The space that usually defines a transition is just as space-less as the space 
between continuous numbers when it comes to experience8—in fact, the numbers interpenetrate (Bergson, 2001, 
p. 97). By approaching the issue of experience through non-linear transitions or dynamics, the problem is posed 
in time rather than in space. Indeed, it is the space-less transition principle that makes the architectural 
experience a stream of indivisible quality as opposed to the infinitely divisible space. According to Bergson, since 
architecture involves indivisible successions of movement animating space, it is an ‘art of experience’, rather than 
an ‘art of object’. For this particular reason, Bergson stated that issues “[…] relating to subject and object, to 
their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than space” (Bergson, 2004, p. 77). How 
is active inference (com-)posed in time? This is exactly the endpoint of scene construction under active 
inference. In other words, inferring the constructed environment rests upon a sequence of (usually visual) 
palpations that successively resolve uncertainty about the causes of sensations such that the next epistemic act 
depends on sensitivity upon the previous action. This speaks to a constructive and temporally extended form of 
evidence accumulation that can be cast in terms of Bayesian belief updating. The very appeal to ‘updating’ speaks 
to the quintessential assimilation in “time rather than space”. 
Within active inference, belief updating rests upon likelihood mappings between causes and consequences—
and, crucially, transitions among hidden states of the world, or may not, be under active control (Figure 4).  In 
active inference under Markov decision processes, this kind of belief updating is usually formalized using generic 
models: e.g. an ‘A’ matrix corresponds to the likelihood, a ‘B’ matrix corresponds to probabilistic transitions 
determined by a policy encoded by ‘π’, a ‘C’ matrix corresponds to the prior preferences about outcomes, a ‘D’ 
matrix corresponds to the initial beliefs before any sensory observation, an ‘F’ function corresponds to the 
variational free energy, a ‘G’ function corresponds to the expected free energy and an ‘H’ matrix corresponds to 
the entropy of likelihood (Parr and Friston, 2019).  
Under this sort of parameterization, the dynamics of perception and action become rather straightforward. 
Accordingly, the belief update of Bayesian beliefs about hidden states become9: 
 𝑞(𝑠𝜏|𝜋) = 𝐶𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝜋,𝜏) 
𝑠𝜋,𝜏 = 𝜎(ln𝐵𝜋,𝜏−1𝑠𝜋,𝜏−1⏟        
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
+ ln𝐵𝜋,𝜏+1𝑠𝜋,𝜏+1⏟        
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
+ ln𝐴 ∙ 𝑜𝜏⏟    
𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) 
Here, given an action policy at a point in time, the hidden state is inferred through a softmax function, ‘σ’, of 
the sum of the prior moment, a prediction of the upcoming moment, and the likelihood. There is no point in 
time during active inference where the immediate past and immediate future are not integrated by being simply 
juxtaposed. Therefore, the discretizing reflected in active inference is only as real as the seconds and minutes of 
our continuous-time. Beyond the aim of resolving perception through action, the take-home message of this 
treatment is that active inference operates under the space-less transition principle of process theory making the 
framework compatible with phenomenological frameworks.  
                                                          
8 See for example Zeno’s paradoxes on Achiles and the turtle and the paradox of the flying arrow. 
9 The notation ‘Cat’ means a categorical distribution, whose sufficient statistics are a vector of probabilities for each alternative state. 
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Figure 4. A. A discrete state-space Markov decision process. This diagram illustrates a probabilistic generative model. The hidden 
states (s) generate sensory observations (o) using the likelihood matrix (A). The transition from one state to the next in time depends on 
the transition matrix (B), which further depends on the action policy. In other words, changes in observations depend on the selected kind 
of action, which in turn depends on the policy. The probability of an action policy depends on the expected free energy and precision, 
which is given by the softmax function of the expected free energy. 𝛾 designates the precision of beliefs about policies, 𝜋. There are many 
alternative policies (𝜋n) considered at the same time, and the precision scores the degree to which their probabilities differ. B. A 
continuous state-space predictive coding scheme. This figure schematically designates 2 hierarchical levels in the brain. The red 
triangles represent PEs while the black triangle represents expectations. Sensory enters at the bottom while predictions emerge from the 
top. The µ represents the expectation, which is adjusted by the ε that in turn represents the difference between sensory input and the 
prediction (Friston, 2019). Note that the ‘s’ in A and B are not equivalent. In A, this symbol refers to a hidden state. In B it refers to a 
sensation (loosely analogous to the outcomes in A).  
 
4. Affordances in architecture 
To apply to architecture, the environment is integrated through possible actions. Since actions are restricted 
by the environment, the structure of the body, and the individual capabilities, they reflect the designed 
environment with a reference in the body. According to Section 2 and 3, the architectural experience is a 
transtemporal consequence of the continuous collection of sensory information, where the modalities differ 
according to their respective sensorimotor contingencies, e.g., when we can look, where we can move, and how 
we palpate. Additionally, our grip on the environment is reflected in the extent of action policies. Under this 
proposed computational neurophenomenological framework, the ecological concept ‘affordance’ corresponds to 
the expected free energy—that determines the probability that “this is the kind of epistemic or pragmatic policy 
that I will pursue”. In turn, this speaks to distinct different kinds of affordance; namely, epistemic and pragmatic 
affordance. As elaborated in Section 3, the epistemic behavior seeks to increase novelty, while the pragmatic 
behavior aims to bring about preferred observations. Such ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ refer to how action 
policies are evaluated (Kaplan and Friston, 2018). This distinction is useful when considering sensorimotor and 
ideomotor dynamics (Hommel, 2009).  
4.1. Sensorimotor and ideomotor views 
In psychological terms, the ideomotor views reflect motor actions that are intended (idea-guided), whereas 
sensorimotor views reflect actions suggested by the environment (perception-guided). Conservative 
sensorimotor views conceive action as re-actions to stimuli—so that behavior is dominated by environmental 
cues. Physical causes are favored above mental causes. In contrast, ideomotor views emphasize goal-directed 
actions that originate from autonomous beliefs about action. The goal is central in such a view. Indeed, these 
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concepts provide a helpful distinction for discussion. During an architectural experience, actions are dependent 
on both external and internal factors because actions are structures that link movement to goals, and goals to 
movements (Prinz, 1997). Behavior necessarily emerges from the dynamics of these views. For instance, in an 
enclosed square space, the behavior of a human being cannot be accounted for by the sensorimotor affordances 
of the built environment alone. It is, however, safe to say that any behavior will be with respect to the 
affordances of the built environment. Behaviors such as wandering around, doing push-ups, jumping jacks, etc., 
these are ideomotor actions that are highly history-dependent, i.e. the centered around the history of the 
individual who has encultured certain actions under certain situations. Behavior can thus be accounted for by 
considering the combination of external Virtual actions and internal affordances. This is precisely where the 
Bayesian brain under active inference operationalizes SMC10 (Figure 5).  
Although recent advances in neuronal process theories have led to different algorithmic models of the 
Bayesian brain, the general approach is based on a hierarchically organized generative model, where the 
hierarchical layers couple through top-down (TD) and bottom-up (BU) signals. In predictive coding schemes, 
hierarchical levels communicate bidirectionally and encode predictions and prediction-errors that are further 
weighted by their precision. When applied to perception and action, the purpose of the generative model is to 
infer by TD predictions the external causes of the incoming BU sensory signals by minimizing free energy. To 
recapitulate, the free energy refers to an information theory measure of surprise, i.e. the amount of prediction-
error (known formally as self-information). Thus, the structure of the inference is reminiscent of sensorimotor 
and ideomotor dynamics. The grip on the environment corresponds to the state space of action policies. Action 
policies reflect the actions that compete in the current situation, biased by both sensorimotor and ideomotor 
processes, to minimize expected free energy. In unknown spaces, action policies under consideration are scanty 
and with high uncertainty, as opposed to known spaces, with a plethora of action policies and with high 
certainty. As exploration unfolds, the precision of beliefs about action policies increases and thereby improves 
the grip on the environment. Paraphrasing Aristotle, the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn 
by doing them. Affordances depend on the sensorimotor dynamics, while a grip on the context where actions 
can unfold depends on actions. Interestingly, sensorimotor dynamics concerning architectural affordances have 
been investigated on a neuronal level.  
 
                                                          
10 An alternative to the contingency-law could be provided by the ‘binding by synchrony’ hypothesis so that the mastery can be defined as 
the practical knowledge in how to map cross-modality information onto each other. Similar to SMC, the main argument is that the 
perceptual experience evident in architectural experience is a matter of temporal coherence rather than states of neuronal assemblies 
(Buzsáki, 2006, pp. 250–261). However, reviewing similarities and differences between SMC and “binding by synchrony” is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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Figure 5. State-space in three dimensions of action policies. Each policy is designated by a box where the size and color are relative 
to the expected free energy. A. A fictive example of high expected free energy among action policies without any apparent attractor. Such 
a state suggests exploring to reduce uncertainty. B. A fictive example of two attractors, i.e. competing action policies, in terms of their 
expected free energy. This could for instance be an ambiguous figure.  
 
4.2. Some empirical evidence 
Process philosophy is a pragmatist philosophy. It renders the temporal development important to understand 
the whole. Applying this approach to cognition and scientific progress, it is found that applicative praxis is the 
best available procedure for assessing scientific progress, i.e. praxis is the arbiter of theory (Rescher, 2000, p. 89). 
Unfortunately, the use of architectural spaces to understand sensorimotor dynamics in the brain is rather limited.  
One way architecture may affect an organism physiologically has been put forward by Fich et al. (2014). Their 
study entailed inducing psychosocial stress using the Trier-Social-Stress-Test in two different architectural 
settings that varied in their ‘openness’, i.e. one space has big windows affording to escape, while the other was 
fully enclosed. Despite being exposed to the same procedure of psychosocial stress, which was unrelated to the 
environment, their results show significant and systematic differences in cortisol levels between the two spaces. 
Fich and colleagues concluded that the enclosed space increased the release of the cortisol hormone due to its 
restriction on the fight/flight mechanism. By measuring cortisol, which is an indirect measure of hypothalamic 
activity, their results indicate that sensorimotor affordances are attuned to unconsciously. 
Paraphrasing, and in agreement with, Dobzhansky “the brain only makes sense to investigate in light of 
behavior”, active inference suggests that selective attention optimizes (higher confidence of) the expected 
prediction by modulating the synaptic gain of prediction-errors in predictive coding, i.e. neurons coding for 
behaviourally relevant prediction-errors should be more responsive. See also (Parr and Friston, 2017, 2018) for 
the equivalent role of precision in discrete formulations of active inference. This has recently been demonstrated 
by Djebbara et al. (2019) in a Mobile Brain/Body Imaging experiment using Virtual Reality to change the forms 
of a transition causing the affordances to change. An electroencephalogram (EEG) was used to analyze 
visuomotor brain activity. Participants were instructed to transition from one space to another, where the 
opening between spaces varied offering three different door-sizes. Of the three types of doors, one was too 
narrow to pass, another was difficult to pass, while the last was easily passable. The results indicate that early 
sensory brain activity differed as a function of affordances reflecting the lower level of the hierarchical structure 
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in PEs stemming from TD predictions and BU sensory signals. These results suggest that sensorimotor 
affordances influence perception (Djebbara, 2020). Analyzing the frequency-domain of the same datasets, 
Djebbara and colleagues were further able to localize alpha desynchronization in the parieto- and temporo-
occipital regions, which may serve as markers for sensorimotor integration during interaction with the 
environment. They conclude that moving in space is to continuously construct a prediction of a world that we 
perceive as dependent on our action potentials. 
Vecchiato and colleagues (2015) also used Virtual Reality and EEG to investigate the sensorimotor responses 
while perceiving different interior designs. The topographical maps of the EEG data indicated activity in 
sensorimotor brain areas when participants were experiencing pleasant, novel, and comfortable interiors. This 
was followed up by an extensive enactive approach to architectural experience suggesting that architectural 
affordances embody thought, while thought can be structured by architecture (Jelić et al., 2016).  
Due to technological restrictions, the few studies are suggestive than conclusive—however, it is crucial that 
the outcomes of the studies do not dwindle in the theoretical literature but instead engender further empirical 
testing. Within process philosophy, the validity of a theory depends on how, and how hard, we question nature 
(Rescher, 2000, p. 83). The progress of this field rests on critical theoretical advances, technological 
developments, and empirical experimentation. Nature will not reveal more than what we forcibly extract using a 
particular instrument at our disposal. In doing so, the empirical results are perceived through the lens of a 
specific theory relative to the limitations of the measuring instrument. Therefore, given the current theoretical 
proposal, the destiny of a computational neurophenomenology rests on technological developments and 
empirical experimentation.  
 
5. Conclusion: a principle of anticipation 
Through a philosophical discussion, phenomenology and SMC were coupled to the experience of 
architecture, emphasizing the dependency on the bodily structure and continuity in sensation and action. 
Hereafter, active inference operationalized the laws considered in SMC allowing us to understand the limitations 
of such contingencies and the underlying neuronal activity bound thereto. Indeed, it is the predictive framework 
of the brain depicted by (variational) Bayesian inference that is doing the heavy lifting in explaining the 
architectural experience. It has been shown that a synthesis of phenomenology, SMC, and active inference 
enables a new perspective on architectural experiences.  
Sensory impressions alone (BU signals) were shown to be insufficient in explaining the architectural 
experience as perception requires a priori (TD) predictions based on earlier experiences from all sensory 
impressions. It is impossible to perceive without a sense of functionality (affordances) stemming from other 
sensory modalities. Although the sensory information is visual, the perception relates to all sensory organs, 
discovering functionalities well beyond visual purposes. The relations between form and perception in 
architectural experience are enriched by the proposed framework as spatial (architectural) Gestalts that can now 
be addressed through empirical studies of architecture relative to the human body and sensory. In line with the 
proposed framework, as the architectural experience is modulated by the affordances it can be deduced that 
perceptual conjurations can be realized through the manipulation of possible actions. Just like Gestalt psychology 
uncovered the role of visual sensory in perceptual experience through two-dimensional illusory studies, so we 
propose that architecture can uncover the role of all sensory in architectural experience.  
Scale, distance, luminance, thermal comfort, and other design parameters can all be biased by the affordances 
of the space. Judging that one space is bigger than another, without this necessarily being true, rests on the 
affordances of all sensory impressions. For instance, the distance from a house in the Parisian suburbs towards 
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the Eiffel Tower was judged shorter than vice versa (Sadalla, Burroughs and Staplin, 1980; Tversky, 1981). Under 
the proposed framework, it is suggested that the judgment of distance depends on the ‘whole’ experience. 
Approaching the Eiffel Tower is arguably a perceptually more exciting experience than the drive away from it. 
Further, after a long walk around the Eiffel Tower and vibrant stimulations from the atmosphere of central 
Paris, one is arguably exhausted on the way back. In this sense, the judgment of distance is an embodied measure 
through perceptual experience that depends on affordances and anticipation. 
The framework proposes a principle of anticipation in architectural experience. In locating the beginning of 
the architectural experience, one must acknowledge the anticipative nature of each sensory modality. As one 
proceeds, the continuous collection of sensory information, which depends on the accessibility of the space, 
contributes to the embodied predictions on the fly. Once arriving at the end of an exhibition in a museum, the 
final space is indeed modulated by all preceding spaces. Furthermore, the following space hereafter is also 
modulated by the final space of the exhibition, and so on ad infinitum. The experience of space thus depends on 
its coherence with its contextual space. Moving in space is to continuously construct a prediction of a world that 
we perceive as dependent on affordances. These are in turn reflected in cortical oscillations. By designing our 
environments, architects design cortical activity. There is still a long road ahead to adequately understand how 
affordances and the dynamics of architectural form impact the multiple levels of the brain. 
 
6. Future research 
Architectural experience has frequently been linked with neuroaesthetics (Vartanian et al., 2013; Skov et al., 
2017). Hedonic psychology and affective neuroscience pursue to understand the underlying mechanisms of 
pleasure, and further how it is represented in the brain (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011). Hedonic value is 
central to the field of neuroaesthetics and can be integrated with the proposed framework. One way for such 
integration is to allow the hedonic value to bias the expected free energy when exploring space. For instance, 
exploring an exhibition at a museum, the sight of a specific painting from afar that holds a hedonic value may 
attract the exploration in that direction. Within active inference, prior beliefs (e.g., the C matrix) present 
themselves as a candidate for integrating hedonic value as they subsume prior preferences about outcomes. 
Another way for such integration is to determine the hedonic value of the actions themselves. For instance, 
recent neuroscientific research in dance indicates a therapeutic effect to combat neurodegeneration (Barnstaple et 
al., 2020). In this sense, there may be an aesthetic value in the actions themselves that can be evaluated. Although 
these areas remain complex to address, the proposed framework allows conceiving aesthetic appraisal as a form 
of sensory exploration where the extent of action policies and minimizing entropy are suggested to play a central 
role.   
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